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1. Introduction
Since  the mid 1990s, with the benefit of a wider understanding of the potential benefits from
yardstick competition between regional monopolies (Schleifer, 1985), practioners and academics
specialising in  regulatory  issues have  been increasingly interested in  developing standardised
performance indicators for monopolies in the infrastructure sector. These indicators can be used by
the regulators to assess the absolute as well as the relative performance of regulated utilities.
Performance  indicators  can  be  separated  into  two  main  categories:  (i)  productivity
indicators and (ii) production and cost frontier estimates. The productivity indicators  are simple1
input-output relations  such as the number of workers per  client or connection. The frontiers
recognise the much more complex nature of interactions between inputs and outputs. The cost
frontiers  show the costs as a function of the level of output (or outputs) and the prices of inputs
and is generally much more useful to regulators who are assessed to assess the wedge between
tariff and minimum costs. The production frontiers reveal technical relations between inputs and
outputs of firms and provides a useful backup when cost frontiers are not easy to assess due to lack
of data.' The inclusion of control variables in the specification of the functional relations estimated
ensures that the various operators of a same activity are effectively comparable. Indeed, once the
frontier has been estimated, the efficiency of a specific operator can be assessed in relation of the
performance of the best operators in the industry when these are confronted with the same factors
constraining the performance of the operator being assessed. 2
The productivity indicators although theoretically inferior to efficiency frontiers are quite
commonly used by regulators to assess the performance of utilities. They are useful complements
to efficiency frontiers, but seldom good substitutes. However, in most countries, data limitations
makes them the only game in town so they tend to be used in conjunction with various types of
quality indicators to obtain a multidimensional snapshot of a firm's  performance. Moreover, the
experience suggests that efficiency frontiers are not flawless. Even when the data controlled by the
firm can be requested from the operators, it is not seldom that the data needed to identify the
specific constraining characteristics of the activity analysed. This results in  an impossibility to
decompose the degree of efficiency that the firms can control from factors that influence costs but
l In choosing between the estimation of a production or a cost function, the regulator needs to take into account the specificities of
the sector he/she is working on. An important characteristic  in regulated utilities is that in general, the firms are required to provide
the service at a preset tariff. In other words, the firms are required to meet the demand and are not allowed to pick the level of
output to supply. Since output is exogenous, the regulated firm maximizes benefits simply by minimizing its costs of producing a
given level of output. Under this situation, in principle, the specification of a cost frontier is often the natural choice.
2 In Chile (water sector) and Spain (electricity), the frontier is calculated on the basis of engineering data instead of relying on best
practice.2
that the firms cannot control (Bums and Estache, 1998). There is however both in the academic
and in the practitioner's literature on regulation an accelerating  tendency to try to rely on estimates
of frontiers to assess the impact of regulatory decisions on the efficiency of operators. This paper
contributes to that growing literature.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical structure of
the cost model estimated. Section 3 provides an overview of earlier studies of the water sector.
Section 4 presents the estimates of costs frontiers obtained for a large sample of Asian and Pacific
Region water companies, distinguishing between public and private operators. Section 5 compares
the performance ranking from efficiency frontier measures to those obtained from productivity
indicators. Section 6 concludes.
2. The theoretical cost functions
The theory draws on standard textbook microeconomics. The problem faced by a regulator
is to  ensure that the regulated firm minimises a total  cost  function subject to  a  target  output
constraint. The solution to this optimisation problem results in an optimal set of inputs, which
depend on the level of output, and on the price of inputs. So, it makes sense to estimate a cost
function at the firm level, which depends only on its output level and on the price of its input. The
theoretical specification of this model is:
C  =  f(Y,Z,PL,PK)
where C is total cost, Y is the output, (which could be something like the number of customers
served by the company), Z is a vector i-dimentional of the relevant exogenous variables needed to
allow comparisons across firms, PL is the price of the labour inputs, and PK is the price of capital.3
The functional form the most commonly used in this type of situation is a Cobb-Douglas 3
where the term which will be used to measure inefficiency (s) enters the model in a multiplicative
way (which becomes additive when the model is estimated using a logarithmic version):
C-A  PI  "  Pkk  YY°  1i= 1Z; r expp
Applying natural logarithm to both sides of the equation results in:
c=  a +PIPI+PkPk+7oY  +Yi=liizi+  E  (1)
where  a (InA),  Pi  andyi  are parameters,  c is ln(C),  pi is ln(PL), Pk  iS ln(Pk),  y iS ln(Y),  7,  is ln(Z 1) and
cE  is the error term.
The systematic part of the model determines the minimum cost that can be reached with a
given set of inputs and control variables and is what is labelled the cost frontier. Conceptually, the
minimum cost function defined a frontier showing the costs technically possible associated with
various levels of inputs and control variables. The error term (£;)  can be decomposed in two parts:
i=  Ui  +V
where uj>0 and vi are not constrained. The vi component captures the effects (for the firm i) of the
stochastic noise and  is assumed to  be iid (independent and identically distributed) following a
normal distribution N(0,av).  The ui component represents the cost inefficiency and is assumed to
be distributed independently from  vi and the regressors. Various distributions have been suggested
in the literature for this term: half normal (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977), truncated-normal
(Stevenson, 1980), Gamma (Green, 1990) and exponential (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977).
The most  common in  empirical papers, and the one that will be used in this paper is the half
An altemative is to estimate a translogarithmic function, although, in this case a Cobb-Douglas specification  may be appropriate since the sample
size is not quite large enough. Futhermore, using a Cobb-Douglas type of function allows to  comply with convexity requirements. Obviously, the
estimates of the efficiency measures will depend on the extent to which the specification of the functional form is correct.4
normal. This distribution imposed that the majority of the firms are almost quasi efficient. There is
however no theoretical reason that impedes that inefficiency be distributed symmetrically as Vj.4
The  estimation  procedure  is  somewhat  cumbersome  and  requires  some  additional
theoretical assumptions.  It  requires first  running the  Standard Least  Squares (SLS)  to  obtain
consistent estimates of the slope parameters. The constant term is biased and has to be modified by
substracting the average u. In the case of the half normal distribution:
E(u) = cu(2/7c)"2.
While the inefficiency component cannot be observed directly, it can be inferred from the
error term si. Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) present an explicit form to decompose
this error term when  ui is distributed as a an average-normal. Both the expected value (E) and the
mode (M) of the distribution of the inefficiency term constrained by the composite error term can
be used in the estimation of ui.
E(ui/Ei)  =  OX/(+X 2){p( siX/c)/AD(-EiX/a)  - Ei/c},
M(Ui/Ei) =E  (&2U/Ca 2),  if si  > 0,
M(ui/si)  =  0, if  Ei <  0,
where  =(&v±cu,)12,  =u/c,  (P.) is the function of probability density of the distribution and (D(.)
is  the  function  of  accumulated density of the  standardised normal  distribution function.  The
parameters a,  and cy, can be computed from the moments of the SLS. The efficiency then simply
comes from:
Efficiency = exp(-uj)
4Green  has notice that the results depend on the distribution used. He found that the gamma distribution produces
results which differ noticeably from those of three (truncated normal, exponential and half normal) alternative
formulations (Greene, 1990). However, this is an empirical problem that can be assessed using the consistency
condition approach presented below.5
The ranking of firms obtained in this fashion are labelled Corrected Least Squares (CLS). It will
always be the same at the ranking generated from the residuals of the cost function since the
average and the mode constrained by the estimation of the residuals ci always increases with the
size of the residual.
It may be worth to point out some relevant features of the half normal distribution. By
construction, the distribution of the term £ is asymmetric and not normal. This asymmetry can be
characterised by the parameter k.  The larger X is, the larger the  asymmetry. In the  empirical
application, the residuals of the regression must be tested to ensure that the skewness is positive. If
the residuals have the asymmetry in the opposite direction, the maximum likelihood estimates is
then the Least Square estimator and a2 0=°.  This implies that all the firms are operating at their
frontier (i.e. are 100% efficient). This could in fact simply be showing that the data is inconsistent
with functional specification selected. (Waldman, 1982).
A second estimation approach can then be used. It consist in estimating the parameters of
the cost function directly through a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure and to then only follow
the procedure described above to decompose the error term. The advantage of relying on ML is that
the  method  takes  into  account  the  asymmetric distribution  of  the  error  term  to  assess  the
technological coefficients.
The following diagrams summarise what has been discussed so far. They also show the
indicators that could be used depending on data availability and quality.6
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Figure 2: Dealing with Data Constraints
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3. A Survey of Empirical Cost Frontiers in the Water Sector 5
As suggested in section 2, in practice, the costs of regulated public utilities depend on a
variety of factors in addition to output levels and input prices. This section reviews what earlier
studies reveal about the relative importance of these additional factors
The first published paper is by Stewart (1993). In a report prepared for the UK  water
regulator,  OFWAT, he estimated a cost function for the UK water sector. Stewart describes the
three stages of the water business: water production (i.e. extraction from natural sources), water
treatment and water distribution. Costs reflect the costs associated with each one of these stages. In
general, these costs can in turn be decomposed into three types themselves: operation, maintenance
and the return to capital. Stewart focuses on operational costs only. As explanatory variables, he
considers: the size of the distribution network, the volume of water sold (these are in fact his two
main variables), the volume of water put through the distribution network, the number of properties
rented, the volume of water sold to non-residential users. In addition, Stewart considers also some
control variables. This requires the identification of the various stages of the production of water
services: production, various treatments, distribution and collection.  Each may involve different
types of treatment, distribution and collection's technology, which have to be modelled somehow
since they have consequences for cost levels. For instance, treatment costs will differ with  the
sources of raw water. "Raw" water can be extracted from two sources: underground and surface
sources. It is important to distinguish because often ground water (also not always) requires less
treatment  than  surface water and  these influents of. In  addition,  Stewart considers as  control
5 From  a methodological  viewpoints  some  of the empirical  studies  done in the UK for Gas (Waddams-Price  and
Weyman-Jones,  1996)  and  Electricity  (Bums  and  Weyman-Jones,  1994)  are quite  useful  and relevant.  Relying  on the
Malmquist  approach,  they separate  between  the frontier  shifts  effects  of privatization  (technological  gains)  and the
catch-up effects reflecting the improvement for a given technology. These studies have however been criticized for
not taking into account properly the effects of external effects (hence the relevance of control variables).9
variables the nature of demand (peak vs. average) and the need for rehabilitation of pipes in poor
state and that will require fixing before long.
The  specific  frontier he  estimates for the  period  1992-93 for a  sample including  all
privatised water companies in the UK is:
LnCOSTS = 3.34 (0.39) + 0.57 (0.08) inSALES + 0.38 (0.08) InNETWORK
- 0.62 (0.27)  STRUC + 0.13 (0.06) LnPUMP
Where COSTS is the total  operational cost in  the water sector expressed in  1000 of  pounds,
SALES is the volume of water sold expressed in ML/d (mega litres per day), NETWORK is the
length of of the network in Km, STRUC is the volume of water sold on average to non-residential
clients/ total volume of water sold, PUMP is the average water pumping needed. 6 The standard
deviations are included in parenthesis showing that all variables are statistically significant at a
90% level of confidence. The R2 is also very high with 0.99.
OFWAT also commissioned a paper by Price (1993) who estimated the following model:
AVOPEX = 17.4 + 1.8 WSZ + I0.3 TT + 0.  IPH-  1.9 BHSZ- 12.I MANHH  + 21.4 BHDIS
where AVOPEX are the operational expenses per unit of water distributed (pennies/m3), WSZ is
the proportion of ground water subject to more than simple disinfection and derived from treatment
generating less than 25 million litres/day, TT is the share of surface water subject to more than
primary treatment plus the share of ground water subject to more than disinfection only,  PH is the
average pumping (expressed in relation to water delivered), BHSZ is the average size of wells
weighted by the share of total water form that source, MNHH is the share of total water distributed
to non residential users and BHDIS is the share derived from wells and only subject to disinfection.
This model has a R2 of 0.851.10
Crampes et al. (1997) estimate a water cost function for Brazil in which they include among
other variables the volume of water produced (a size parameter), the relation between the volume of
billed water and the volume of water produced (a proxy for commercial and technical losses) and
the number of connections per employee (a proxy for the type of technology). This last variable can
however also be seen as an efficiency proxy which is reasonable to use the estimation results to
discuss costs, but is not when it comes to use the cost function as an estimate of the cost frontier,
since the cost  frontier can no  longer be used to  assess efficiency. Estimating the model  with
weighted least squares yields for total costs:
COSTS = 5.599 (8.36) + 0.380 (4.18) PROD-  0.01 (-10.0) PROP] + 0.590 (8.94) SALAR
- 0.  712 (-3.  77) PROP2 + 0.689 (6.04) CONE - 0.004 (-4.  0) PROP3
COSTS is total costs, PROD is the volume of water produced, PROP1 is the relation between
operational expenditures and revenues, SALAR is the  average salary, PPROP2 is the relation
between number of connections and the number of employees. CONE is the number of connections
and PROP3 is the relation between the volume of water billed and produced. The t-statistic is
included in parenthesis showing that all variables are significant and the R 2 is 0.840.
And for average costs:
COSTA  VER = 13.954 (18.15) - 0.674 (-5.57) PROP4 - 0.01 (-10.0) PROP]
+ 0.598 (8.67) SALAR - 0.907 (-5.85) PROP2 - 0.005 (-5.0) PROP3
COSTAVER is the average cost and PROP4 is the relation between water produced and the number
of connections. The R 2 is 0.46.
6 The pumping variable is defined as follows: Average pumping = i (li*wpi) di where li is annual average load in
location i in meters, wpi is the volume of water pumped during the year in location i, di is the distribution input and i
is the location where the pumping takes place.11
While these studies are useful to assist in specifying the costs models, they are not sufficient
since they do not include any information on the prices of all inputs (including the price of capital)
as is required by Cobb-Douglas or translogarithmic specifications  typically found in the literature.
4. Data and estimation of the costs frontier for Asia
The cost frontier for the Asian water companies was estimated from a database published by
the  Asian  Development Bank  (1997).  Their sample  covers  50  firms  surveyed  in  1995. The
information included  data  on  operational and  maintenance costs  (COST), number  of  clients
(CLIEN), daily production (PROD), population density in the area served (DENS), number of
connections  (CONE), percentage  of  water  from  surface  sources  (ASUP), treatment  capacity
(CAPAC), market structure (STRU, represented by the relation between residential sales and total
sales in  cubic meters),  number of  hours of water availability  (QUALI), staff  (PERS),  salary
(SALAR)  and  a  set  of  qualitative  variables  on  the  type  of  treatment  used:  conventional
(DUMCONV, with a value of 1 when the treatment is conventional, 0 otherwise), rapid sand filters
(DUMFRAP,  with  a  value  of  1  is  the  firms  use  the  filter,  0  otherwise), slow  sand  filters
(DUMFLEN, with a value of I if used, 0 otherwise), chlorification (DUMCLO, with value I if used
with sand filters, 0 otherwise and desalinisation (DUMDES, in, fact only 1 does).
The  basic  statistics  are  summarised  in  table  1.  The  costs  refer  to  operational  and
maintenance costs and are expressed in thousands of US$. The client's numbers and the population
are expressed in thousands. Treatment capacity is expressed in cubic meters per day.  Average
salaries are found as the ration of total salary cost to the number of workers
The strategy adopted to  estimate the model could be summarised as follows. In a first
stage, all the variables likely to determine costs are included in the model. Next, going from the
general to  the  specific, variables  are eliminated as  follows:  eliminate  sequentially the  least12
significant variable (any variable with a less than 10% level of significance) and reintroduce at
each stage the variable eliminated at the previous stage to ensure that the variable eliminated at the
previous stage are still not significant (otherwise, the significant ones are restored in the model)
.The model is specified to estimate 2 measures of efficiency which can be  used to establish a
ranking of firms.
Table  1
Spb  -- - Av Me-  M-i-n:m  Min  n  Sndara
COST  50  42256  532749  49  92271
CLIEN  50  2453  10595  11  2945
PROD  50  935  4959  2.4  1254
DENS  50  16587  236297  165  33479
CONE  50  416  2099  1.8  548
ASUP  50  0.67  1  0  0.41
CAPAC  44  1168  6190  2.8  1552
PERS  50  3145  25057  15  4275
GDP/CAPITA  49  2385  26730  180  5097
SALAR  50  5042  39130  35  8619
QUALI  50  18.98  24  4  6.85
STRU  45  0.42  0.84  0.09  0.16
The first function to estimate is similar to what is done in Stewart (1993) and Crampes et al.
(1997), although it also includes the GDP/capita (in US$) as a control variable. 7 In addition, since
the quality norms can differ across countries, the model includes a quality indicator (the number of
hours during which water is available every day) 8. To be able to distinguish public and private
firms, the specification includes a dummy reflecting ownership (DUMPUB, with a value of 1 is the
' Not many papers compare companies in various countries. Yunos and Hawdon (1997), for instance, compare the performance of
operators in Malaysia with those of other similar developing countries (countries of the region with similar per capita income). The
main challenge stems from the difficulty of comparing distinct monetary units and often different accounting rules. One solution is
to assess the production function since it only requires physical measures of inputs and output. (Yunos and Hawdon estimate a
production function). However, in the case of regulated operators subject to contracts imposing exogenous output levels, the correct
model has to rely on an specification of the cost function.
8  To monitor the quality of service delivered by the operators, OFWAT relies on a set of  indicators:(OfWAT, 1995): water
availablility, water pressure, service interruptions, water use restrictions, responsiveness to complaints about bills, and to written
complaints. Due to  limited data availability, this paper relies only a single  indicator of  quality: number of  hours of  water
availability13
firm is public and 0 otherwise and a variable DUMCON, which takes a value of 1 is the fiin  is
concessioned and 0 otherwise).
In COST = cx  + ,B  In SALAR + y 0 In CLIEN + y, DENS + 72  CONE + Y 3 E=STRU+ Y 4 ASUP
+  ±y  CAPAC +  76  PROD + 77  DUMCONV +  78  DUMFRAP + yg  DUMFLEN
+ y70  DUMCLO + y,, DUMDES + Y72 CALID +  713 PBIPC + Y14 DUMCON + Y15  DUMPUB
One of the problems with this  specification is that only one firm (Male) desalinises and it thus
impossible to  compare  it seriously to any  other because it  is impossible to  separate the  firm
inefficiency from the  effect of the treatment. Our solution was to  exclude this  firm from the
estimation sample. The efficiency of that specific firm was estimated from a comparison of its
actual costs and those estimated from the frontier of the sector. This may however be a problem
since its inefficiency level may simply reflect the fact that the specific treatment cost used is simply
more expensive that the others.
The final model used to calculate the efficiency measures is:
In COST = a + ,  In SALAR +  r 0In CLIEN + yl DENS + 72 CONE +
y3STRU + y4  QUAL  + y5  DUMCON
For the CLS (corrected least squares) results, the signs of the coefficients are expected. The labour
price elasticity is positive (0.43) and an improvement in quality increases costs and so does an
increase in production (clients or connections). The density of population has a negative elasticity
suggesting that it is cheaper to supply the same population in a smaller service area. Finally, the
sign of the concession dummy is negative suggesting that costs are lower in concessionaire firms. 9
More specifically,
In COST = - 0.56 (0.91) + 0.43 (0.05) In SALAR + 0.72 (0.08) In CLIEN-  0.19
(0.08) In DENS + 0.32 (0.05) In CONE -0.56  (0.19) In STR U
+ 0.32 (0.16) In QUALID-  0.82 (0.47) DUMCON
9 The coefficient of asymmetry of the CLS residuals has the correct sign (see section 2).14
Number of observations: 44; R2 = 0.947; F-Statistic = 93.70;
A = 2.465; u=  0.514; E(u) = 0.38.
The standard deviations  are in parenthesis. The individual efficiency measures and the  firm's
associated rankings are presented in table 2.
Table 2
Almaty  0_  71  28  0.56  26
Apia  0.39  42  0.24  43
Bandung  0.28  44  0.15  44
Bangkok  0.72  27  0.78  14
Beijing  0.69  _  0.66  23
Bishkek  0.98  7  0.97  5
Calcutta  ____0.81  16  0.63  24
Cebu  _  _0.60  33  0.40  36
Chennai  Sd  sd  Sd  sd
Chiangmai  0.96  9  0.96  6
Chittagong  0.74  23  0.47  32
Chonburi  0.45  41  0.41  34
Colombo  0.68  30  0.51  28
Davao  0.96  10  0.74  19
Delhi  0.77  19  0.70  21
Dhaka  1.00  _  0.87  10
Faisalabad  0.74  24  0.43  33
Hanoi  0.85  12  0.50  29
Ho Chi Minh  0.65  32  0.47  31
Hong Kong  0.66  0.77
Honiara  0.58  34  0.36  37
Jakarta  035  43  0.24  42
Johor Bahru  0.57  35  0.60  25
Karachi  1.00  I  1.00  1
Kathmandu  Sd  sd  Sd  sd
Kuala Lumpur  0.83  13  0.87  11
Lae  0.74  25  0.68  22
Lahore  1.00  1  0.97  4
Mal6  Sd  sd  Sd  sd
Mandalay  0.98  26  0.76  3
Manila  0.72  8  0.99  16
Medan  0.48  37  0.33  39
Mumbai  0.47  38  0.31  41
Nuku'alofa  0.76  21  0.48  30
Penang  0.80  18  0.74  18
Phnom Penh  1.00  1  0.86  12
Port Vila  Sd  sd  Sd  sd
Rarotonga  Sd  sd  Sd  sd
Seoul  0.81  15  0.81  13
Shangai  0.83  14  0.96  7
Singapore  0.74  22  0.75  17
Suva  0.94  11  0.96  8
Taipei  Sd  sd  Sd  sd
Tashkent  0.77  20  0.72  20
Thimphu  1.00  1  0.95  9
Tianjin  0.46  40  0.40  35
Ulaanbaatar  0.52  36  0.33  38
Ulsan  1.00  1  1.00  2
Vientiane  0.47  39  0.32  40
Yangon  0.80  17  0.52  2715
The individual efficiency measures (and the rankings) of Chennai, Kathmandu, Port Vila,
Rarotonga and Taipei, could not be calculated at this stage because there was no data available on
the market structure. To address these limitations, we estimated first the cost frontier through CLS
by assuming that the 5 firms for which we did not know the actual market structure, the average








The regression results from the ML estimates are as follows and the resulting efficiency
measures and ranking are covered by table 2.
In COST= -2.15 (1.80) + 0.41 (0.09) In SALAR + 0.80 (0.14) In CLIEN
- 0.31 (0.16) In DENS + 0.38 (0.09) In CONE-  0.75 (0.40) In STRU
+ 0.40 (0.19) In QUALI - 0.55 (0.72) DUMCON
A=  173.51 (24582); oa  1.32 (0.21).
5. Other performance measures
This section compares the ranking resulting from the efficiency indicators with the ranking
from efficiency frontiers to assess their consistency and to see if the conclusion reached above in
particular with respect to the relation between ownership and perforrnance. For consistency to hold,
the efficiency measures generated by the two approaches must show at least a positive correlation
with the partial productivity indicators, even if weak since they are not all as effective at taken into
account the control variables (Bauer et al., 1998).16
5.I. Assessing the consistency of measurements
To assess these consistency conditions, we rely on the indicators estimated by the Asian
Development Bank  (1997). These  indicators cover tariffs  (average tariff/cubic meter,  average
monthly  bill,  technical  efficiency  measures  such  as  water  losses,  operational  characteristics
(number of hours/day when service is available, purchasing power of the population in relation to
their water bill, consumption, subsidies, share of households with water meters, access to public
fountains, salary of the directors) and measures of performance such as accounts receivable and
number of employees per 1000 connection).
Relying  on  accounts  receivable  and  number  of  employees  per  1000  connection  as
performance indicators yields two ranking (one for each indicator).
Table 4
- Fbim  Act wn  Re>x  cvabl1;  J.  !j  V  OO
Almaty  5.4  34  13.9  33
Apia  s.d.  s.d.  15.8  35
Bandung  11  7.7  24
Bangkok  2  22  4.6  12
Beijing  0.1  2  27.2  46
Bishkek  7.7  41  6.9  21
Calcutta  1.5  16  17.1  38
Cebu  1.9  21  9.3  27
Chennai  5.8  36  25.9  45
Chiangmai  1.2  15  2.9  9
Chittagong  10  42  27.7  47
Chonburi  1.6  19  2.6  7
Colombo  3.2  27  7.3  22
Davao  0.5  7  6.2  18
Delhi  4.5  32  21.4  42
Dhaka  11  43  18.5  41
Faisalabad  12  45  25  43
Hanoi  0.1  2  13.3  31
Ho Chi Minh  3.4  2.9  6.4  20
Hong  Kong  4  30  2.8  8
Honiara  5.4  34  10.7  29
Jakarta  1  11  5.9  16
Johor  Bahru  2.5  25  1.2  4
Karachi  16.8  46  8.4  25
Kathmandu  4.5  32  15  34
Kuala Lumpur  0.5  7  1.1  2
Lae  3  26  17.1  38
Lahore  7  40  5.7  15
Male  1  11  7.6  23
Mandalay  0.2  6  6.3  19
Manila  6  37  9.8  28
Medan  0.1  2  4.9  13
Mumbai  19.7  47  33.3  48
Nuku'alofa  1.5  16  16  36
Penang  2  22  4.4  1117
Phnom Penh  0.9  10  13.5  32
Port Vita  0  1  5  14
Rarotonga  s.d.  s.d.  3.5  10
Seoul  1.5  16  2.3  6
Shangai  11.1  44  6.1  17
Singapore  1.1  14  2  5
Suva  6  37  8.9  26
Taipei  1.7  20  1.1
Tashkent  6.3  39  17.9  40
Thimphu  4  30  25.5  44
Tianjin  0.1  2  49.9  49
Ulaanbaatar  2  22  579.2  50
Ulsan  0.5  7  0.8  1
Vientiane  3.3  28  16.1  37
Yangon  s.d.  s.d.  12  30
To test the assumption that the 3 rankings are not correlated, we run a Spearman test of
ranking correlation. The correlation's measured are summarised in table 5.
Table 5
Stochastic=
Frontier CLS  1.000  0.861**  -0.205  0.090
Stochastic
Frontier ML  1.000  -0.172  0.371  *
Accounts
Receivable  1.000  0.332*
Employees  per
1000 connections  1.000
*  means that  correlation  is significantly  different  from  0 at a 20%  level of significance.
**  means that  correlation  is significantly  different  from 0 at a 10% level of significance.
The correlation between the rankings from the account receivable and number of workers
per 1000 connections) is positive and significantly different from 0 at the 10% level of significance.
However, the correlation from the ranking resulting from accounts receivable is negative with the
two rankings derived from the frontiers suggesting that the two approaches are not consistent (ie,
frontiers vs. partial indicators). This means that the regulatory assessments would vary with the
approach adopted!" 0 As for the number of employees per 1000 connections, the correlation with the
10  It could be argued that all the firms with accounts receivable for less than 3 months cannot be considered inefficient. However,
even if all firms with receivable under 3 months were assigned a ranking of  1, the correlation between the rankings would be
similar.18
two frontiers ranking is positive and  significantly different from  zero but  it is relatively low.
According to  Bauer et al. (1998), this is an expected result in  view of the control issue raised
earlier. "
To assess the relation between a firm's performance, its ownership and the degree of private
sector participation (public enterprise, concession, private provision only on production, or only on
billing and collection), the following covariance matrix is useful, with the t statistics needed to test
that the correlation is zero (null hypothesis) is given in parentheses.
Table 6
Accounts  0.13  -0.09  -0.12  -0.16
Receivable  (0.95)  (40.68)  (-0.86)  (1.15)
Employees per  0.19  -0.04  -0.086  -0.08
1000 connections  (1.34)  (-0.34)  (-0.59)  (-0.61)
Table 6 shows that the signs of the correlation coefficients confirms that the private sector is
more efficient since any time the private sector is involved the correlation is negative. The larger
the accounts receivable (best practise is no more than 3 months), the larger the inefficiency of the
firm. And similarly the larger the number of employees per 1000 connections. This means that we
can reject the assumption that there is no correlation between performance and ownership with a
strong degree of certainty (with a 10% level of statistical significance). This result is consult with
the one derived from the cost frontiers and hence provides a strong presumption of robust evidence
that private participation cut costs.
I  ISee section 5.2.19
5.2. The conditions for  consistency
Up to now, we have presented two broad approaches to analyse the performance of firms:
partial productivity indicators and frontiers. We have argued that these frontiers provide a better,
more complete, snapshot. However, there is no real consensus among researchers as to how to
measure this frontier. Yet, the choice of method can influence regulatory decisions. The problem
stems  from the multiplicity  of individual efficiency measures available. So  a  far  question is
whether efficiency studies are useful at all.
Trying to answer this question, Bauer et al. (1998) propose a set of consistency conditions
with which the efficiency measures derived from the various sources must comply to be relevant
to regulators. They must be consistent over time, and with the other performance measures used by
the regulators. More specifically, the consistency measures are:
*  The efficiency measures generated by the various frontiers methods must yield similar averages
and standard deviations
*  The various approaches must rank firms in a similar way;
*  The various approaches must identify the same best and worse firms;
*  The  individual  measures must  be  reasonably  consistent  over  time  and  should  not  vary
significantly from year to year;
*  The  various  measures  must  be  reasonably consistent  with  the  results  expected  from  the
developments in the industry. In the particular case of regulated enterprises, for instance, the
firms regulated through a price cap mechanisms are expected to be more efficient than those
regulated through a rate of return regulation; and
*  The efficiency  measures must  be  reasonably consistent with  other performance measures
(accounts receivable and employees per 1000 conections, in this paper) used by the regulators.20
Overall, the first three measures show the extent to which the various frontiers approaches are
mutually  consistent,  while the  other conditions  show the  degree  with  which  the  efficiency
measures generated by the various approaches are consistent with basic facts. In other words, these
last condition provide an "external criterion" to assess the various approaches.
5.3. Using efficiency measures in the practice of regulation
One of the main changes of the last decade in the practice of regulation has been the
adoption by a large number of regulators of some form of price cap regimes. The main purpose of
a switch from rate of return regulation to price cap regulation has been to increase the incentive for
firms to minimise its costs and to ensure that eventually users will benefit from these reduction in
costs-typically  within 3-5 years after a regulatory review of improvements in the efficiency in the
regulated sector. The adoption of price cap regulation is one of the main reasons for this increase
in the efforts to measure efficiency in regulated sectors. Indeed the cost reductions observed will
be associated with efficiency gains which have to be measured. Efficiency measures are no longer
a side show as they are under rate of return regulation.
The initial regulatory  challenge at the time  of  a price review is the  following. If the
productivity gain used to assess the new price cap is specific to  the firm and based on gains
achieved by this firm in the past, this firm will not have strong incentives to improve efficiency to
cut costs because this would result in a lower price cap. An alternative for the regulator would be
to measure efficiency gains by relying on factors which are not under the control of the regulated
firm. But in that situation, if the regulator has very little knowledge of the past costs of the firm
and based its measure of efficiency gain on, for instance, the productivity gains in a related sector
in the economy, some perverse effects may penalise the firm. This is why the suggestion to rely on
yardstick competition is so tempting for regulators. Price can be set for an industry based on the21
aggregate industry performance. For instance, the price cap can be based on the average unit cost
in the industry rather than on the firm specific average unit cost and this gives a strong incentive to
the firm to have a unit cost below average. In this context, efficiency measures are an input in the
regulatory mechanism in an even more direct way than under rate of return regulation.
The next regulatory challenge is to understand that efficiency gains of a firm can come
from two main sources, which require some idea on the part of the regulator of where the cost
frontier lies. Indeed, gains can come from shifts in the frontiers reflecting efficiency gains at the
sectorial level. Efficiency gains at the firm level can also reflect a catching up effect. These are the
gains to be made by firm not yet on the frontier. These firms should be able to achieve not only the
industry gain but also specific gains offsetting firm specific inefficiencies explaining why the firm
is not on the frontier. This is why it is so important for a  regulator to be  able to  use all the
information provided by frontier based measures in the firm specific tariff revision.
This  can  be  done  by  recognising that  efficiency indicators  are by  construction index
numbers varying from 0 to 1, when 1 reflects the fact that a firm is totally efficient and 0 that it is
completely inefficient (i.e. as far as possible from the sector frontier). For instance, if a firm has an
efficiency index of 0.8, it means that it could produce the same level of output at 80% of its
current costs. This means that the cap should be based on 80% of current cost, not 100%. With this
approach,  only  the  firms  reaching  100% of  efficiency  would  be  allowed  to  recover  their
opportunity cost of capital while the others would have lower rates of return.
A simple example will clarify this point. Imagine, that an industry regulated through price
caps has a recognised cost of capital of r with a stock of capital of K. If the firm sells a unit at a
unit cost of C, the price P that the regulator would approve would usually have been
P = r*K + C22
Now under the adjusted rule, and using a  as the efficiency index for the firm, the new price NP
that the regulator should allow would be:
NP=r*K+ci(C
This new mechanism automatically cuts the rate of return for the inefficient firm and to get to the
industry rate of return, the firm has to cut cost to reach the industry efficiency standards.
The implementation of this mechanism however requires that at the minimum, the first two
consistency conditions are met (consistency in efficiency levels and ranking). If these are not meet,
these mechanism cannot be applied since the individual efficiency measures would be somewhat
subjective and hence unreliable. However, if the third consistency rule is met, (consistency in
identifying best and worse performers), it would still be possible to use a third approach: publish
the results. This approach is used in the UK in the water and electricity sectors. The idea is to
inform the users and allow them to compare prices and services across regions and give them a
reason to put pressure on their own operator if it is not performing well.
A fourth  mechanism requires none  of the  consistency conditions  and is  proposed  by
London Economics. The idea is to estimate a stochastic average cost function (different from the
frontier)
C=mo+m 0 Z+,
where the parameters measure the sensitivity of costs (C) to variables Z 1. Then, the regulated prices
are fixed according to the estimated costs. The difference with the second mechanism, is that the
regulator now recognises the average cost of the firm instead of the frontier costs. For instance, the
idea to use average cost instead of minimum cost to set the efficiency parameter has been proposed
for electricity in the UK (CIE, 1994).23
6. Conclusions
The main point of this discussion is that these efficiency indicators are not just  simple
"academic" exercises but that they can be used to yield results with very direct applications in the
regulatory process.
The results presented here stress the advantages of relying on efficiency frontiers over the
usual aLternative  options in the process of implementing yardstick competition. This methodology
allows to control for factors over which the operators have no  control (i.e. diversity of water
sources or of water quality, characteristics of users). For instance, Dhaka is ranked first if the
stochastic frontier is estimated using CLS. It is ranked 43 and 41 respectively, relying on more
traditional indicators such as account receivable or numbers of workers per 1000 connections.
As for the impact of ownership on the efficiency of operators, both the CLS and the ML
models show that the private operators are more efficient. In monetary terms, the total gains for the
region of an efficiency level similar to the one achieved by private operators would be around
US$85 millions per  year." 2 This means that the gains of  every new concession would be  on
average of around US$1.8 million per year.
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